Based on the information uncovered so far, the National Sovereignty Protection Authority has launched investigations against the affected parties, civil organizations, and companies.
Exploiting 21st-century technologies and regulatory gaps, certain players on the domestic left, politically active civil organizations, and parties can receive funds in a non-transparent manner using fundraising sites and modern payment services, thus concealing the identity of donors. This is revealed in a new analysis by the National Sovereignty Protection Authority, which can be downloaded from the organization’s website.
“New channels for financing party, campaign, and political pressure activities have emerged, allowing for the foreign financing of party political activities,” states the analysis.
The authority primarily examined the complex connections between database building, fundraising, and payment services, concluding that transparency has become practically impossible in these new IT-supported funding methods.
The analysis specifically mentions the American platform Action Network (AN), which assists left-liberal actors in achieving their goals and is associated with events such as the anti-Trump Women’s March, anti-gun rallies, and climate protection actions linked to Greta Thunberg. It is worth noting that among the partners of Action Network are various far-left, even explicitly communist organizations.
In Hungary, AN is connected (or was connected) with several left-wing parties, including the DK, MSZP, Párbeszéd, and Péter Márki-Zay’s Everyone’s Hungary Movement. AN also played a role in Gergely Karácsony’s mayoral campaign. Furthermore, many left-wing organizations and individuals in the Hungarian political scene, such as the Tanítanék Movement, Szikra Movement, the Mérce website, the Partizán media platform, and András Pikó, the mayor of District VIII, count as partners.
The analysis also names the Lunda fundraising site, which supports progressive political forces and was developed by Estratos, the successor to Bajnai Gordon’s DatAdat. It should be remembered that DatAdat played a significant role in the left’s campaign during the 2022 elections. The company, led by Ádám Ficsor, who served as Minister without Portfolio for civil national security services in the Bajnai government, primarily provides data management and software development services to left-liberal parties and also organizes “micro-donation campaigns.”
According to the analysis, the Action Network, being an American platform, could not operate in multiple languages and currencies, whereas Lunda is “tailored for Europe.” The Action Network and the Lunda fundraising platform are available as a package, capable of providing comprehensive services together.
Recently, the Lunda platform received donations for the noÁr movement, DK, and the page supporting Péter Juhász’s candidacy in District V. The authority also highlights that these systems are supported by FinTech tools developed in recent years, which significantly simplify money transfers. An example mentioned is the widely used Barion online payment platform, which, while facilitating money movements for many users, also makes it much easier to maintain anonymity, as it does not require identity verification for daily transactions under 3.5 million HUF.
What does this mean? It means that neither the fundraiser nor the recipient of the donations has the donor’s information. This is likely not a concern for the previously listed actors, as it allows foreign donations to be easily concealed. It seems possible that someone from the United States, through the Lunda platform, can make donations to a political party or civil organization operating in Hungary without providing real personal data. Therefore, no one will know from whom or where the support came.
The analysis also mentions that Estratos conducts data management activities for progressive NGOs and left-wing parties in Poland and Italy, outlining a network closely connected to the American Democratic Party, which deliberately targets certain EU countries.
Furthermore, the analysis states that the National Sovereignty Protection Authority has launched investigations against the affected parties, civil organizations, and companies based on the information uncovered so far. The authority believes that the uncovered examples in Poland and Italy probably do not reveal the network’s entire European activity, so further investigations are needed in the future.
Edited by Ivan Hajda
